After I put up the piece on the Mail on Sunday’s report about a mad mullah, Sheikh Yassir al-Habib, raising money to buy a Scottish island so that he could turn it into a Muslim theocratic enclave, I went searching the net to see if I could find any material on Muslim separatism in the UK. I haven’t been able to find many, but I did find a couple that were insightful. One was an article by Tahir Abbas in the Journal of Contemporary European Studies published by Taylor & Francis, ‘Conceptualising the Waves of Islamic Radicalisation in the UK’. This is an academic article and so it’s written in very dense language. However, the section ‘Understanding the Islamist Waves in the UK’ presents a relatively straightforward account of the history of Muslim radicalisation in Britain. This runs
‘After World War Two, imperial powers controlled much of the Muslim world. Decolonisation, military coups, and despotic regimes increasingly alienated young Muslims in the Muslim world and among Muslims in the west. By 1979, an Islamic Revolution in Iran had toppled one of these governments and inspired others to rise against their own rulers. For some young Muslims living in Britain at that time, Iran’s revolution was an inspiration; it showed them they were capable of forming their own country and self-determining their own futures. As a result, many became interested in studying Islam, and several travelled to Iran to do so ). In recent years, there has been a worldwide increase in violent extremism, which may be partially attributed to rifts caused by globalisation that have led to more individuals becoming radicalised in pursuit of their own interests. This has led to an increase in terrorism, which has resulted in increased security measures being implemented by governments around the world, including those attempting to combat violent extremism through de-radicalisation programmes or similar activities aimed at preventing violence directed at other groups or individuals within a certain area.
Current social and political unrest ranks among the most challenging in recent memory. Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, terrorist attacks on civilian targets in Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa have resulted in the deaths of thousands of people. This is a threat not only to physical security but also to global security, as terrorists can readily spread their message through social media. However, radicalisation, which is seen as a precursor to violent extremism and later terrorism, continues to be a difficult topic (see above). Radicalisation is a phenomenon that cannot be linearised due to its complexity. It is best understood as a collection of slight changes that accumulate over time to tell a story of transformation. While radicalisation and extremism are frequently used in public discourse, the term ‘radicalisation’ has been used in the media to characterise those who may adopt an extremist mindset and perform violent acts, whilst ‘extremism’ refers to those who advocate political views or hate campaigns. For some years, radicalisation has been a major concern for the British government and its security services. Over the past three decades, there have been four waves of reasons why young Muslims in the UK felt the need to travel abroad to engage in Jihadi missions. The first and second waves happened during the 1980s and 1990s; the third wave began after 2001; and, most recently (after 2011), there has been the apparent emergence of ‘homegrown’ terrorists.
Since the 1980s, radicalisation has been a characteristic of the Muslim experience in Britain. It is the belief that social and political grievances, as well as a sense of being unsupported, contribute to the appeal of radical ideas. To attract a Muslim population deemed to be technically deficient, radical viewpoints are based on an aggressive religious agenda. Young British Muslims will be attracted to radical thought as long as they are dissatisfied with the status quo and support a global jihad, both of which were evident during the last years of Blair’s administration as a result of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The first stage of radicalisation began shortly after the Iranian Revolution, when the first wave of young British Muslims left for Jihadi missions. Between 1979 and 1984, this was fuelled by the Iranian Revolution’s propaganda, which made Salafism more popular. Next, jihadists such as Abdullah Al Faisal, Omar Brooks, Anthony Garcia, Richard Dart, and Moazzam Begg were taught at international jihadist camps in Pakistan, Waziristan, and other regions. The growing body of research shows that if lone wolf terrorists are left to stew in their extremist views and become radicalised, the likelihood of them conducting an attack increases exponentially. The internet is littered with thousands of videos, articles, and other propaganda materials that can radicalise individuals. In addition, lone wolf terrorists’ social networks often provide key support in their radicalisation. Recent research by Bloom et al. shows how private messaging applications such as Telegram have been highly effective for Islamist terrorist organisations in providing secure lines of communication between recruiters and potential recruits. This enables recruiters to embed themselves within communities, build personal relationships with recruits through a plethora of instant messenger-like features, share religious teachings and propaganda, send updates on warfare against the West, images of violence against perceived enemies, and calls to action (conducted through private messages) without fear of being tracked by authorities. These sociological pressures facing young Muslims in the UK were greatest in the 1980s and until the Islamic State. Throughout this time, different waves of young Muslims went elsewhere to engage in Jihadi missions because their radicalisation became apparent at home.
Most scholars and commentators agree that radicalisation began as early as the 1980s, when a group of young Muslims under the leadership of Syrian-born Omar Bakri Muhammad called Hizb ut-Tahrir began propagating their view of Islam. By 1986, they had released their manifesto and were calling for a worldwide caliphate. Despite many arrests, Hizb ut-Tahrir was still going strong in 1988, and by 1989, they were calling for the transformation of Britain into an Islamic state. In 1990, Al Muhajiroun distributed leaflets advocating violence against Hindus and Jews. These groups were founded on anti-colonialist and pan-Islamic principles, which attracted thousands of young people from all over the world. They expressed their disillusionment with Western society through cultural traditions such as music and literature. These are just two examples among many others that show how radicalism developed in Britain before 9/11. As such, it is inaccurate to say that radicalism emerged solely because of a reaction to foreign policy, Iraq, or any other factor external to Britain itself. The evidence suggests that there has been a gradual process over decades that has led directly to terrorism today. It suggests that British extremists, with a focus on Islamist or jihadi groups, are formed within the countries of birth for most of these individuals and groups.
The radicalisation of young Muslims by Islamist ideology occurred from at least the mid-1980s. There were several key turning points when small groups of young Muslims decided to join violent Jihadi missions. Each time a new wave emerged, several factors contributed to their radicalisation: foreign wars (e.g., Bosnia), global and local politics (e.g., the Palestine/Israel conflict), domestic issues (e.g., deprivation) and security responses (e.g., the 7/7 bombings). The number of people involved was small, but it did not take many individuals to cause havoc. The issues facing young Muslims have evolved as well – for example, there was no radicalism until London’s African-Caribbean communities were rocked by riots in 1981. However, these waves of radicalisation started to slow down after 9/11 because they became harder to justify with so much anti-Muslim sentiment across Europe. Those who attract and radicalise potential young Jihadists are a small group whose influence exceeds their numerical size. Some, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, are well-known Islamist organisations, while others are merely ad hoc groups of individuals that gather around an imam preaching extremist ideas. Gender and age also help to shape terrorist narratives. Among British Muslim men who had joined Islamic State, terrorism and radicalisation created a framework for what it means to be a man. When young men have a sense of purpose and belonging (especially those who do not fit into mainstream society), they are more likely to be drawn towards certain ideas and worldviews – even if that means embracing terrorism or leaving their friends and family behind. Muslims are being radicalised once again today. But, unlike yesterday, they are being radicalised to fight on British streets rather than for a state in another country. This is a religious anomaly that puts many young Muslims in danger. Lack of integration and economic marginalisation make these youngsters more prone to extremist beliefs, as they believe they have no other option except to turn to violence.’
The section ‘Discussion and Concluding Thoughts’ also contains additional information
‘The origins of radicalisation are varied, with economic, political, and religious elements being the most prevalent. British Muslims have been radicalised for decades, but the first wave of radicalisation in Britain came in the 1980s, during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Kashmiri resistance to Indian occupation. This wave of British Muslim radicalisation occurred during the Cold War, when there was increased tension between Pakistan and the UK over Kashmir. Some young men became involved with groups that wanted to fight against Great Britain and its allies in support of Kashmir’s independence. In the 1990s, Bosnia was visited by the second wave of refugees. The third wave of insurgents formed in Afghanistan before 9/11. This was followed in the 2000s by a fourth wave that was more violent and entailed more attacks on Western targets, especially after the illegal war on Iraq in 2003. In recent years, there has been a fifth wave of radicalisation among British Muslims, with many becoming increasingly focused on non-Western wars such as Syria or Iraq, such as the seven hundred or so British citizens who joined Islamic State between 2012 and 2016. British Muslim radicalisation, therefore, is a complex phenomenon that involves many varied factors and can manifest in many different ways. There are many different waves of radicalisation for various reasons: some people become radicalised for economic reasons; others because they feel excluded from society due to discrimination or racism against them; some people become radicalised for religious reasons; others because they feel alienated from their communities or societies around them; some people become radicalised for political reasons; others because they have experienced something traumatic like war or conflict in their lives; some people become radicalised due to social media-driven propaganda by extremist groups like Islamic State and al Qaeda, which attempts to convince young men and women that violence against innocent civilians will bring them closer to God.
In the last couple of decades, there has been a growth in radicalisation among British Muslims. It is important to understand why British Muslims are radicalising to get a better understanding of how to stop it. There are waves of Muslim radicalisation in Britain, but each wave is characterised by different forms of radicalisation, including suicide bombers and al-Qaeda-inspired attacks. The waves of British Muslim radicalisation have been a long time in the making. The reasons for this are multi-faceted but can be divided into three main categories: political, socio-economic, and religious. The political climate in the United Kingdom during this period has been characterised by racial tension and unrest; inter-ethnic tensions were high, with reports of public disorder throughout the country. It has been followed by an economic crisis in Britain, which has resulted in high unemployment rates among working-class groups. In addition to these factors, there was also a significant rise in Islamist fundamentalism at this time, as well as an increase in anti-Muslim racism and violence. These waves have continued into modern times, with many Britons who are Muslims feeling alienated from society as well as being engaged in criminal activities such as drug dealing or other forms of crime like theft or fraud. Government surveillance has been used to monitor British Muslims for decades to identify those who might pose a threat if they were radicalised. This surveillance has led to many being monitored for years without any action being taken against them. There have also been numerous instances where those who have been radicalised have returned home without making any attempt at conducting an attack on an individual or group of people.
There are many reasons why British Muslims might decide to become more radicalised. One of the most crucial factors is their lack of integration into British society, and they often feel disconnected from the rest of society. This can lead them to feel alienated and angry, making them more susceptible to extremist groups such as the Islamic State or Al-Qaeda. Another factor is their lack of access to education. Many British Muslim children are not receiving an education that prepares them for life after secondary school or college. This lack of education can lead them down a path towards extremism because it does not teach them how to think critically about religious texts or other sources of information. Finally, some people may be drawn towards terrorism because it gives them a sense of purpose and belonging – they may never have felt like part of society before but now see themselves as part of something larger than themselves that needs fixing. British Muslims feel disconnected from mainstream society and see their religion as a way to reconnect with it. Another is that young British Muslims have been taught by their families and communities that there are problems with the West and its values, and they want to help fix those problems.
Based on an observational methodology, I argue that British Muslim radicalisation has occurred in waves, with each wave having its own sociological and foreign policy impact characteristics. It is unclear what will happen next concerning British Muslim radicalisation—but it is possible to appreciate that British Muslims are radicalised in diverse ways, and there are several different waves of radicalisation. First, British Muslims who have been radicalised tend to be those who were already susceptible to the ideas of radical Islam. This is because they have been exposed to these ideas not only on the internet but also in their everyday lives. They may have come from families where there was a lot of tension between Muslims and non-Muslims, as well as other groups such as Jews and Hindus. They may also have had previous contact with people who had gone on to become extremists. Second, British Muslims who are radicalised tend to have low levels of education and employment. This means that they do not feel accepted by society or that they can be effective by trying to work within the system; instead, they feel that they need to separate themselves from society so that they can work towards their own goals. Third, British Muslims who are radicalised tend to come from lower middle or working-class backgrounds and live in urban areas (such as London or Birmingham). Radicalisation in British Muslim communities is a complex phenomenon that hinges on many factors. While some have argued that it is a response to discrimination, others contend that the root cause is in fact poverty, which makes it difficult for Muslims to find jobs and leads them to feel they have no hope for the future.’
Abbas concludes
‘British Muslim radicalisation can be traced back to the period of immigration to the country. Most of these immigrants originated in South Asia. As these new immigrants conformed to British culture and society, they began to integrate. During this time, however, there were also instances in which individuals felt alienated by their new surroundings or dissatisfied with life in Britain. Therefore, radicalisation should not be viewed as the problem of a few stray individuals. Instead, radicalisation is a social phenomenon, a social problem, and a social outcome; no radicalisation occurs in a vacuum. It exists because it is the tipping point a person reaches as a result of the frustrations they experience in their daily lives, where they do not have the answers to the questions they seek regarding the self and other and are pessimistic about the future due to the precariousness of their realities. Therefore, the different waves of radicalisation in the United Kingdom reflect distinct periods of economic decline and misfortune that disproportionately affected Muslim minorities.’
See: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14782804.2023.2204421#d1e337
This is a very thorough article tracing the roots of radicalisation among British Muslims to foreign events, such as the war in Bosnia in the ’90s, Muslim resistance to the Indian occupation of Kashmir, the wars in Afghanistan and Blair’s illegal invasion of Iraq, as well as sociological factors in the UK, including high working class unemployment, racism and islamophobia and lack of proper education, as well as a ‘crisis of masculinity’ amongst young Muslim men. Hopefully, with more carefully reasoned analysis of these movement like the article above, better ways will be found to prevent further radicalisation and convince otherwise alienated individual susceptible to radical ideologies that they are nevertheless important parts of modern multicultural Britain, and that their integration into wider British society will benefit them and their communities, rather than the adoption of hatred and violence.
Beastrabban\'s Weblog 