Posts Tagged ‘Casualties’

Vox Political: Youssef El-Gingihy on Western Imperialism in Iraq

August 21, 2016

Mike’s also put up an excellent piece by Youssef El-Gingihy, ‘Business as Usual in Iraq’. I think Mr Gingihy is a medical doctor. He’s certainly a very firm opponent of the privatisation of the NHS, and has written a book against it, How to Dismantle the NHS in 10 Easy Steps, published by Zero Books. I found a copy of this in the Cheltenham branch of Waterstones.

El-Gingihy makes the point that the Iraq invasion was not an aberration, but merely the continuation of American and British global imperialism. This isn’t about making the world safe for democracy, but in the forcible acquisition of other nation’s industries and resources. He points out that Tony Blair wasn’t Bush’s poodle, but took part in the invasion of Iraq perfectly willingly as part of the Atlantic Alliance. George Bush senior and Maggie Thatcher armed Hussein in the Iran-Iraq War, and his gassing of the Kurds in 1988 aroused no condemnation from us. The US military-industrial complex was determined to invade Iraq, because its acquisition was estimated to be worth $100 billion to the American economy. This was only the latest in a series of coups that have overthrown popular elected leaders in countries around the world, so that America can get its hands on their countries’ valuable economic assets. This goes back to the overthrow of Mossadeq in Iran in the 1953, who had the audacity to nationalise the Persian oil industry, and Salvador Allende in Chile in 1975, who was ousted because he was a Marxist and wanted to break up the great estates to give land to the peasants.

He also sees Bush’s decision to disband the Ba’athist army, whose troops then joined the jihadists fighting against the occupation and the Shi’a and other factions, which supported or benefited from it, as part of the imperial tactics of divide et conquera. As a result of the invasion, Iraq has been transformed from a secular dictatorship into a breeding ground for terrorists. There were only a few thousand globally at the time of 9/11. Now that number has increased to about 100,000. The number of Iraqis, who’ve been killed may be as high as 600,000 +. America maintains its global dominance through a network of 800 bases worldwide. At the time of 9/11, the Americans drew up plans to invade seven countries, and El-Gingihy notes how the wars and destabilisation have spread to other countries, like Yemen. He makes the point that if we really wanted to stop terror, we should stop supporting countries that are funding and supporting it, like Saudi Arabia. But that isn’t going to happen, because Saudi Arabia is our ally.

He concludes

Tony Blair famously called on history to be his judge. That judgement will be one of eternal damnation. He has already attempted a spirited defence but, as with Lady Macbeth, not all the perfumes of Arabia can relieve the stench of blood on his hands.

See his article: https://thexrayfactor.wordpress.com/2016/08/19/the-iraq-war-was-simply-business-as-usual/

Mike’s reblog is at: http://voxpoliticalonline.com/2016/08/20/the-iraq-war-business-as-usual-youssef-el-gingihy/

Everything Dr El-Gingihy has said is correct. The Iraq invasion was all about stealing the country’s oil and state industries. Iraq has the largest oil reserves after Saudi Arabia, and Aramco, the American-Saudi oil company, and the other oil magnates, desperately wanted to get their hands on it. The Americans also drafted legislation declaring that any rare crops still grown in Iraq were also automatically owned by American biotech companies. Iraq and the Fertile Crescent is the area where western agriculture started at the dawn of civilisation nearly 6,000 years ago. Then, Neolithic farmers began cultivating varieties of wheat, which have largely been superseded in the west, like emmer. These varieties may, however, have properties which have been lost in later varieties, and so are of intense interest to the biotechnology companies and agribusiness. A year or so ago there was even a feature about the renewed interest in emmer in farming in Britain on the Beeb’s farming interest show, Countryfile. The legislation cannot practically be enforced, but it means Iraqi peasant farmers in theory have to pay American biotech companies for the privilege of rearing crops they’ve been raising since literally the dawn of civilisation.

And the same goes with other parts of the economy, like industry. Halliburton and the rest of the big businesses pressing for war had Bush, who was deeply involved with them, pass legislation allowing them to acquire Iraqi businesses in recompense for possible damages they had sustained, even if, in fact, they had not suffered any damage. It’s a deeply iniquitous piece of legislation. Both of these laws were revealed in articles in Private Eye years ago. And it bears out what the Joseph Bronowski, the great scientist, broadcaster and Fabian Socialist said in The Descent of Man way back in the ’70s: War is theft by other means.

And the number of coups promoted by America is a long one, and getting longer all the time. William Blum in an edition of his Anti-Empire Report links to a complete list of them, since the 19th century, which stretches on and on. it includes the overthrow of Alfredo Benz’ regime in Guatemala in the 1950s, because Benz nationalised the estates of the American United Fruit Company, which, along with the other landlords, treated their peasant workers as slaves. Benz was a threat to American business, and dared pass legislation giving greater welfare rights and power to the peasants. So he had to go. And Shrillary Clinton has followed. A few years ago she made sure that the coup that toppled a democratically elected socialist president in Honduras was not called a ‘military coup’, so that Obama could keep funding the country’s new, military overlords. These are, as you can imagine, the usual right-wing tyrants ruling through terror, violence, assassination and imprisonment. But they have the support of Obama and Shrillary, who no doubt claim the coup was in America’s best interest.

And so we continue to see the agony of the world’s weaker nations, all for the profit of western, chiefly American, multinationals.

Remember the chanting of the anti-war protesters during Gulf War 1 back in 1990? ‘Gosh, no, we won’t go. We won’t die for Texaco’? It’s even more relevant now.

The Foundation of the NHS: The Conservatives’ Reaction to the Beveridge Report

February 16, 2016

As I mentioned in my last post, I’ve been discussing the origins of the NHS with a presumably Tory critic, who took issue with my statement that Nye Bevan is the NHS’ founder. Among his other points, he argues that Winston Churchill was in favour of it, and the NHS would have happened regardless of who was in government at the time.

I have argued that Churchill was in fact highly ambivalent about it. Sometimes he was for it, at other times against. G.C. Peden, in his British Economic and Social Policy: Lloyd George to Margaret Thatcher (Oxford: Philip Allan Publishers Limited 1985) has this to say about the public and the government’s response to the report.

The focus for discussion of postwar social planning was the Beveridge Report on Social Insurance and Allied Services (Cmd. 6404). The Report appeared in December 1942, at a time when ultimate victory could be foreseen and when new incentives had to be found to maintain the war effort. Despite this, the Government was cautious, if not openly hostile, to Beveridge’s proposals for universal social insurance, without means test, against interruption of earning due to unemployment, ill health or old age. It was true that the Anglo-American peace aims in the ‘Atlantic Charter’ of 1941 had included a reference to ‘social security’ but Churchill thought that such plans should be substantially left until after the War. As Harris (1977) has shown, the Beveridge Report had been very much Sir William Beveridge’s own handiwork. His committee had been expected to deal with technical questions related to workmen’s compensation for industrial disease or injury, and with anomalies in social insurance, such as the well-known one whereby a man whose earning were interrupted because of unemployment received a higher rate of benefit than if he were sick. Beveridge, however, had gone beyond his terms of reference and had called for an attack on Disease, Ignorance, Squalor and Idleness as well as Want – the five giants on the road of reconstruction, as he called them in Bunyanesque language. In particular, he stated that no satisfactory scheme of social security could be devised unless there were family allowances, comprehensive health and rehabilitation services, and avoidance of mass unemployment. Indeed, the actuarial soundness of Beveridge’s plan depended upon the average rate of unemployment being no higher than the lowest level in the 1930s; that is 10 per cent of interwar insured labour force or 8.5 per cent of the wider body of insured employees in the new scheme (Cmd 6404, pp. 120, 154-65, 185-6). Uncertainty whether unemployment could be controlled, and memories of the political consequences of an actuarially unsound unemployment insurance fund in 1931, no doubt contributed to the Treasury’s critical reception of the Report.

Nevertheless there can be little doubt that the Report was extremely popular with the general public and, following a backbench revolt in parliament, the Government felt compelled to commit itself to Beveridge’s plan, at least in principle. Widespread support for universal social insurance without means test may have been the result of what Titmuss called a ‘war-warmed impulse of people for a more generous society’. On the other hand, the fact that so many people in the armed forces and munitions industries could not but be uncertain about their own post-war employment, in the light of post-1918 experience, must have been a factor. In the interwar years the unemployed had always been a minority of the electorate; in the war those who felt threatened by unemployment may well have been a majority. Moreover, the associated prospect of universal health insurance may well have been attractive to people had been finding the cost of private health insurance a burden.

Key interest groups were also generally in favour of Beveridge’s ideas. The evidence presented to Beveridge’s committee showed that hardly any trade unions opposed extensions of national insurance and even business witnesses generally favoured more intervention by the state in matters relating to national efficiency. The one business group clearly adversely affected by Beveridge’s proposals were the industrial insurance companies which had helped to administer national health insurance since 1912. Beveridge not only recommended their exclusion from this, but he also proposed that national insurance should cover workmen’s compensation and funeral grants, thus taking away business from the companies. These seem, however, no longer to have had the influence they had had in Lloyd George’s time, and the state no longer needed their administrative expertise. Wartime experience had created new attitudes about what the state could achieve. All this does not mean, however, that there was necessarily a consensus in favour of a ‘welfare state’ except in the most general terms. Looking at Beveridge’s five giants in turn, one finds that sometimes proposals were agreed for differing motives, or on an inadequate basis, and that sometimes there were serious disagreements between Conservative and Labour members of the Coalition government.

For all its reservations on Beveridge’s main proposals, the Government did agree in principle with his assumption that there should be a comprehensive health service available to all, without any conditions of insurance contributions. The trouble was that it proved to be impossible during the war for the details of such a service to be agreed, either between political parties or with the interest groups involved. Certainly war had increased the state’s role. Greatly exaggerated prewar estimates of numbers of casualties in air raids had led to the provision of 80,000 Emergency Hospital Service beds, compared with 78,000 beds in voluntary hospitals and 320,000 in local authority hospitals. Moreover, the Emergency Hospital Service gradually extended its operations from war casualties to treatment of sick people transferred from inner city hospitals and then to other evacuees. In discussions in 1943-45 on a future national health service, however, both Conservative ministers and the British Medical Association showed themselves to be determined to safeguard private practice and the independence of the voluntary hospitals. In particular, there were deep differences between successive Conservative ministers of health, Ernest Brown and Henry Willink, who were responsible for health services in England and Wales, and the Labour Secretary of State for Scotland, Tom Johnson, who was responsible for health services north of the border. For example, Johnson successfully opposed the idea of maintenance charges for patients in hospital. The 1944 White Paper on A National Health Service (Cmd 6502), which was signed by Willink and Johnston, left much undecided and was avowedly only a consultative document.
(pp 139-40).

The National Health Service Act of 1946, and its implementation on the Appointed Day in 1948, was a considerable achievement of Aneurin Bevan, the Minister of Health. Bevan’s original nation health proposals differed from those of Willink, his Conservative predecessor, chiefly in respect of the degree of the Ministry’s control over hospitals and doctors, and in the emphasis given to group partnerships of doctors in local health centres. Whereas Willink had wished to preserve the independence of voluntary hospitals, Bevan took over all local authority and voluntary hospitals, except those not necessary for the National Health Service (NHS). Bevan’s biggest problem was with the British Medical Association which, as late as February 1948, organised a poll of its members which resulted in a vote of 8:1 against the Act. Bevan was aware of the need to meet the medical profession on some points. In particular, he was willing to allow private beds in NHS hospitals so as to attract the best specialists into the service. He met the general practitioners’ fears for their independence by promising that there would be no wholetime salaried medical service. In the end the doctors and consultants were given a larger place in the administration of the NHS than Willink had envisaged.

(pp. 155-5). Thus, while the Tories did have a role in the creation of the NHS, the government as a whole only reluctantly accepted its necessity after it won a general acceptance amongst the electorate and parliament. Yes, Willink did play his part, but the ultimate creation of the NHS was under Nye Bevan.

There is much, much more I could write on this, but at the moment this ends the discussion.